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No. 1734

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GDR DAILY COMMENTS ON NATO REACTION TO BERLIN INITIATIVE

AU251056 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 23 Oct 79 p 2 AU

[Commentary by Hartmut Kohlmetz: "Whose Interests Are Being Threatened?"]

[Text] Everything seemed to be clear, the decision by the next NATO council meeting on the deployment of additional new American medium-range weapons in West Europe envisaged for December seemed to be a foregone conclusion. After all, journalists, NATO military figures and politicians have been performing their extraordinary calculating tricks for months on end, and have let their imaginations run wild in assessing the Warsaw Pact's military strength--in stating their own military strength they suffered from acute amnesia as usual--in order to drive home to the public: NATO has to "rearm" in the nuclear field in order to keep up with the Warsaw Pact. This is how one can turn things upside down.

On the other hand, even an institution above suspicion of communist leanings like the London Institute for Strategic Studies had to admit in its annual report "Military Balance 1979-1980": "We come to the conclusion that today there is an approximate balance between the nuclear armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact." Those NATO propagandists who always eagerly brandish the institute's data to corroborate their lies about the "danger from the East," obviously overlooked page 117 this time.

Given the existing balance, the stationing of new American nuclear missiles in Central Europe would fundamentally alter the strategic situation, the balance of forces that has evolved, in favor of NATO. Naturally the socialist countries could not stand idly by. They would be compelled--as has always been the case in the past, incidentally--to "catch up with the armament" and take the necessary additional measures to ensure their security.

But this vicious cricle is not a natural law, it can be broken. The readiness of the Soviet Union to reduce its medium-range weapons if NATO foregoes additional new weapons of this kind in Western Europe, declared by Leonid Brezhnev on 6 October in Berlin, points the way. This unilateral advance concession of withdrawing troops, tanks and other military equipment only emphasizes just how serious the intentions of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states are, how far they are willing to go.

If certain circles in the West present these offers as a "danger" (FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE) or an "attempted intimidation" (DAILY TELEGRAPH) designed to prevent the NATO council meeting from taking momentous decisions, then this demagogy is only too easy to see through. Of course the initiative emanating from Berlin is designed to prevent a new round of the arms race, because this alone corresponds to the aspirations and interests of the peoples in the socialist as well as in the NATO states. So, whose interests are being threatened by disarmament proposals?

The peoples of our continent now direct the urgent question to those responsible in the NATO states of how serious their speeches on peace, detente and disarmament are. If they are to be taken at face value, then the deployment of new medium-range weapons cannot be on the agenda of the NATO council, but only an offer in response to the proposals of the Warsaw Pact states which follows their good example. The socialist states would be only too willing to expose themselves to such a "danger" or "attempted intimidation" on the part of NATO.

CSO: 2300

GDR MEDIA REACTION TO NEW U.S. MISSILES IN FRG

LD201130 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0515 GMT 20 Oct 79
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[Text] Berlin--Those people "who so diligently advocate the stationing of the new U.S. medium-range missiles in the FRG, which will heat up the arms race and destabilize the situation in Europe, are under a fatal self-delusion." This is stated by NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in a commentary today. "They evidently fail to grasp the full extent of the danger which their policy harbors for their own country and even for themselves. They are burying their heads in the sand against the fact that nuclear war would involve everyone," the paper adds.

"On the other hand," the commentary continues, "leading representatives of the FRG have repeatedly stated that they want to achieve concrete disarmament results, continue detente and deepen relations with the socialist countries. But how can this be reconciled with the argument that first they must agree to station these nuclear weapons in the FRG, after which there could be negotiations? The escalation of the arms race to a new level would then already have taken place."

The question facing the FRG and all its citizens is: "Instead of creating further risks wouldn't it be better to strengthen peace and detente and thus reduce the risks? Wiser people in the FRG are asking themselves this question. Voices are being heard warning against disregarding Leonid Brezhnev's offer, against blocking or talking to death decisions crucial for peace."

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes in conclusion: "The FRG is confronted with an inescapable decision. Some people find this irksome and talk about being subjected to pressure. Yet when pressure tends to widen detente, consolidate security and develop cooperation, it should be regarded as beneficial. Pressure to disarm is surely better than giving further momentum to the arms race."

CSO: 2300

POPULATION DECLINE ANTICIPATED DESPITE STATE MEASURES, INCENTIVES

Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 30 Sep 79 p 22

[Article by Pal Magyar: "Decline Expected. The Effect of Family Planning. The Good and Bad Example of Budapest"]

[Text] "Problems of family planning and the ups and downs of the number of births during the last three decades have inevitably turned many obstetricians into experts on demography. Especially interesting comparisons can be made by those who observed these events in the provinces as well as in the capital." We are quoting from Dr Andor Gyongyossy, candidate and chief physician of the obstetrics and gynecology department of the MAV [Hungarian State Railways] Hospital. He has been a professional observer of the demographic situation of our country for a long time: he published his conclusions 12 years ago in an article titled "Our Population Problems" in a volume of papers put out by the MAV Hospital. At the time serious problems existed as a result of the complete freedom excessive number of medical abortions accompanied by the lack of modern contraceptive methods. The number of abortions in Budapest was almost four times the number of live births. Infant mortality statistics also contained some depressing data.

Decreasing proportion

During the first half of the last century the most highly developed countries of the period in Europe and North America had a natural population growth rate around 1 percent. The number of births and deaths were equally large; life expectancy was substantially shorter than today. Subsequently, there was a gradual decrease in the mortality rate as a result of the progress of medicine; however, the number of births remained unchanged, resulting in a temporary increase of natural population growth. This period is often referred to as the age of "demographic revolution."

The "population explosion" characterizing the developing nations of today can also be explained in terms of the improved medical services and progress in public health; however, it is not being accompanied by increased job opportunities and the way of life of the population remains essentially the same. Elsewhere, on the other hand, industrialization and urbanization

created increasing employment opportunities for an increasing population and the changing lifestyles resulted in a decline of the number of births. Thus, the old rates have been restored. Egon Szabady, chairman of the Demographic Committee of the MTA [Hungarian Academy of Sciences] stated that the comparison of statistics from economically backward vs. developed countries shows that birth rates are high (3.5 to 4.5 percent) in countries with per capita national income under 1,000 dollars, while in countries with per capita national income exceeding 1,000 dollars the birth rate is substantially lower (1.0 to 2.0 percent).

In our country the process called "demographic revolution" (i.e., the temporary jump in population growth followed by the restoration of equilibrium) started later, in the middle of the century; natural population growth remained relatively high up until the first world war. Between the two world wars the number of births decreased more rapidly than the number of deaths; as a result, natural population growth was reduced below 0.6 percent around 1938. However, the fundamental factor is the birth rate and this remained high in the last quarter of the 19th century over the area of present-day Hungary, exceeding 4.0 percent. The birth rate began to decline before the turn of the century; on the eve of the second world war it was only 2.0 percent. At the time, our country's position in this regard was about average among European countries. After the relative increase following the war, there were less than 20 live births per year per thousand in 1952.

The latest paper by Dr Andor Gyongyossy, the obstetrician-gynecologist "inevitably turned into demographer," with the title "Recent Characteristics of Family Planning in the Capital and the Provinces," deals with the most recent period stretching from 1951 to the present. He gives a survey of birth and mortality rates, the natural growth rate arising from the difference between the two as well as the trends in the medical abortion rate. He discusses the most important events which had an effect on these trends, i.e., the complete ban on medical abortions in 1953, the abolishment of the same in 1956, the introduction of child care assistance in 1966 following various other types of benefits, the latest regulation of medical abortions in 1973 and the limitation of opportunities.

After a Peak

The ban on abortions was followed by a jump in the number of births: the "Ratko children" were stretching the capacity of nursery schools, kindergartens and schools to the limit. This wave peaked at 23 births per thousand in 1954. This was followed by a decline lasting for a decade and a half, reaching its deepest point in 1962 at 12.9 births per thousand. A slow but steady increase resulted from the benefits and child care assistance while the stricter conditions placed on abortion opportunities led to a sudden, albeit temporary, increase. The peak occurred in 1975 with 194,000 live births. It must be noted that this rise was also influenced by the fact that the "Ratko children" reached childbearing age just around this time.

This wave seems to be receding at present and in the future we must expect an even greater decline, due to the very low number of births during the preceding 15 years; this is the generation reaching childbearing age just now.

As Dr Gyongyossy explains, the birth rate is unfortunately not increasing at the rate necessary for preserving a stable population size. The natural growth rate established at the turn of the century is declining at an accelerated rate. After the end of restrictions on abortions in 1960, there were 35 pregnancies per 1,000 inhabitants but only 15 live births. Only in the 1970's did the number of abortions decline below the number of births. Budapest has been leading the way in the decline of births. There has not been any natural population growth in the capital for 20 years (only migration); in fact, population is declining. During the 1960's there were 50 pregnancies per 1,000 inhabitants but only one fourth to one third of those were carried to term.

The introduction of child care allowances or the limitations placed on abortions did not lead to the results hoped for in the capital. Due to the aging of the population of Budapest, the number of deaths is on the increase. On the other hand, our capital is also providing a positive example: the rapid decline in the number of abortions during the seventies at a rate much higher than the rest of the country certainly deserves attention. Relative to population size, Budapest has the least number of abortions at present. It appears that over a decade of contraception propaganda has had an effect. The ideal situation would be one where prevention would be the only method used in family planning, where no unwanted pregnancies would occur and there would be no need for abortions at all.

The relevant data for Szabolcs-Szatmar megye are compared to the capital: the number of births has always been high there. As a result, natural population growth was twice the national average despite an increased mortality rate. (Gyongyossy: "This megye maintains its role as one of the foodbaskets and important labor reservoirs of the nation.") The number of abortions in this remote megye has always been lower than the number of births. Although there has been a further reduction in this regard during the 1970's, this trend is slower than average and is barely noticeable. Undoubtedly, Budapest is leading the way in contraception. These methods are making only a slow progress within the country as a whole, with Szabolcs-Szatmar being probably the slowest.

The comparison between natural population growth in Hungary and in other socialist countries is striking. The unique and remarkably high averages for Romania are related to the well-known draconian regulations. Aside from that, the accelerated rate of industrialization and urbanization has everywhere led to declining birth rates over the past few decades. The rise achieved as a result of strict limitations in Romania was only temporary. On the average, population growth of socialist countries is between 0.7 and

1.0 percent, which is the optimal birth rate necessary for development and replacement of the workforce. It is difficult to understand why our country does not reach this level: among socialist countries, we are in last place. This is in spite of the fact that we live in an identical system under similar conditions; our circumstances are not among the worst. Hungary is the "oldest" socialist country, since almost one fifth of the national population and one fourth of the population of the capital consists of people above 60.

Upset Balance

The author emphasized the disadvantages of fluctuating population growth and the destruction of the equilibrium among age groups for the life of the nation: labor surpluses alternating with labor shortage, fluctuating demand for school places, the increasing number of old people needing support. He concludes that the effect of administrative measures on restoring the balance of family planning is pronounced but short-lived; the effect of economic benefits, on the other hand, is smaller but more long-lasting. The establishment of normal demographic trends requires, aside from material foundations, a change in public attitudes. Obstetricians and gynecologists can accomplish a great deal in this regard at their own posts.

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POPULATION OF CARPATHIAN BASIN BEFORE CONQUEST ANALYZED

Budapest HISTORIA in Hungarian No 1, 1979 pp 26-28

[Round-table discussion by Gyorgy Gyorffy, doctor of historical science, chief scientific researcher (MTA TTI, [Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of History]), Peter Hanak, doctor of historical science, department head (MTA TTI), Laszlo Makkai, doctor of historical science, chief of scientific researcher (MTA TTI), and Andras Mocsy, corresponding member of the Academy, university professor (ELTE BTK [Lorand Eotvos University Faculty of Philosophy]): "The Peoples of the Carpathian Basin Before the Conquest"]

[Text] Peter Hanak: A century, or even just 50 years, ago, memories of the time of the Conquest in Hungarian common knowledge were linked to Etelkoz, Verecke, and Pusztaszer. These place-names are slowly paling into literary memory; their place in present-day historical knowledge is being taken by Vertesszokos, Fenekpuszta, and Szabolcs. During recent decades historical knowledge and the direction of interest have been fundamentally altered. Excavation has replaced myth. The advance of social and cultural history has broken the sway of political history, which was dominated by a public law orientation, and interest has turned from the heroic deeds of the leaders to the culture-creating activity of the peoples of the Danube region.

Interwoven throughout this interest is exacting proof, and an increased demand and respect, for facts. The stone, the bone, the tools and the [archeological] finds have become of primary importance to support research and verifications.

Andras Mocsy: Unquestionably, archeological discoveries have placed in the hands of historical science such source material that, in contrast to the sparse transmitted written or oral traditions, may be regarded as objective. The material brought to light by archeology was not bequeathed to posterity because people wanted to say something about themselves with it. Those things, as "rubbish," or as burials which remained as simple traces of settlement because they simply came about.

Hanak: What does the archeology of this period say about the centuries preceding the Conquest, about the Hungary of Conquest-period, and in general about the peoples who lived on the territory of our country?

Mocsy: We know about cultures and we are familiar with peoples in the Roman period and in the early Middle Ages. There are cultures which we can link to peoples. We can say which people--perhaps several peoples--was the carrier; at the same time we are familiar with cultures which we cannot yet link to certain peoples. It is probable that cultures are much more characteristic of periods than of peoples. The relation of culture and ethnicity is the subject of heated debate. There is, however, another important reference-point of archeology, and that is settlement. Here we may mention the example of Fenekpuszta or of one of the most famous Transdanubian excavations, Tac, or I may cite my own latest excavation, Tokod. In each case continuity of settlement exists between two different, but contemporaneous, cultures, between which there is no continuity. We have settlements that, after the close of a great historical period, continued to exist, such as, for example, the Roman period settlement Fenekpuszta, which long survived the Roman period. Here, however, a sharp hiatus followed the 5th century. During the most recent excavation a mass grave was discovered in which the dead lay unburied for a half year, perhaps even longer, which indicates a sharp break in continuity. An example of another type of continuity is the Tokod fortress, where a small Romanized population, which can be demarcated very precisely even from the standpoint of their life circumstances, continued to live relatively free of war until the end of the 5th century in a Roman-period settlement.

We can responsibly say today is that we know of neither an archeological culture nor a settlement in the Carpathian basin in the 8-9th century which could be traced to the Roman period. And conversely: we know of no settlement that existed in the 8-9th century in such a way that it would have been continuously settled for centuries going back to the Roman period. What sort of peoples lived here in the 8-9th century? We must first think of the Avars, or rather, of that culture which archeologists, with what is sometimes perhaps excessive caution, call the Avar-period, rather than the Avar. We can also think of the Slavs, about whom what is interesting is on the other hand, that in the 8-9th century we cannot speak of a single Slav culture, but of several archeological cultures, among which one or another may be attributed, with greater or lesser certainty, to the Slavs--or even as Slavs.

Gyorgy Gyorffy: A Byzantine source from the beginning of the 7th century affords a glimpse into the national origin peoples who lived here. During the war between Byzantines and Avars 8800 warriors fell into Byzantine captivity, among whom there were 3000 Avars, 3000 Gepids, 800 Slavs, and 2000 barbarians, probably Bulgars. This reflects what kind of people we can consider in the Carpathian basin around the time of the 7th century. At the time of the migrations, the Gepids inhabited the eastern half of the Carpathian basin and Transylvania and they never moved from there, but by the 9th century, disappeared like the Avars. There was even an old Russian saying: "They disappeared like the Avars."

Mocsy: Yes, we may cite several examples of such disappearances. The Sarmatians, for example, possessed so to speak the entire Alföld for 4

centuries. Although two of their leaders are mentioned even after the collapse of the Hun empire in the 5th century, from that time on all traces of them are lost in the sources. In such cases, it is not a question of a catastrophic death of a people, but rather that of a communal life of a people disrupted to such an extent that it cannot maintain it on even the most primitive tribal level. It can be more easily absorbed even through a change of language.

Hanak: So far there has been no reference to one people--the Dacians--who played a signal role at the time of the Roman Empire. True, we have solid information about them only from the 1st century B.C., and later from the 1-3rd century. At the beginning of the 2nd century, Trajan conquered the Dacian state, which extended over the region of Transylvania and the Lower Danube. The province of Dacia stood under Roman jurisdiction for approximately 170 years (for much less time than Pannonia, where Roman rule lasted for more than 4 centuries). The question is whether during these 170 years the Dacians died out or, having been Romanized, survived to the end of the 3rd century when Rome withdrew from this eastern province before the successive attacks of the Goths?

Mocsy: The situation with the Dacians is the same as with the other autochthonous peoples of the Roman period. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Romans nowhere created a tabula rasa, nowhere committed genocide. Nevertheless, the original inhabitants of the Roman possessions disappear along with Roman rule. The native Illyrians and Celts were absorbed similarly to the Sarmatians, and the Dacians obviously shared in this fate; they did not survive the period of Roman Rule. As a people, as an ethnic group, they disappeared.

Laszlo Makkai: Let me cite here an outstanding Romanian archeologist and historian who passed away not long ago, Constantine Daicoviciu. In a work of his that appeared shortly before his death--very largely in agreement with what Andras Mocsy was saying--he says the following: "The second half of the 5th century inaugurates an era of fundamental disturbances (that is, on the territory of Transylvania--my addition), every large or tiny community known to have been of Daco-Roman population up to then appears abandoned (archeologically--my addition). The autochthonous Daco-Roman population does not reveal its presence so decidedly in the archeological remains, indeed, it is a question of the temporary abandonment of old communities, and of the withdrawal of the Daco-Romans into the hills. Only after a time, which could not have been very long, did the natives return to territories that had in the meantime been occupied by Slavs, beginning with the 3th century." Daicoviciu therefore the outstanding Romanian historian, also states that between the 6th and 8th century, on the entire territory of historic Hungary, to which he also adds Transylvania, population continuity is broken.

Hanak: I cannot omit here a seemingly serious methodological consideration. To what extent can the archeological finds and the archeological sources be identified with an ethnic group? In his introductory words, Andras Mocsy was speaking rather about cultures, about settlements, which cannot always be linked to an ethnic group. Well, can we in this case link it to a definite ethnic group?

Mocsy: From written historical sources we have to know on what territory a people lived at a certain time. If at this same time a tangible archeological culture extends to this same territory, then the identification is permissible. One of the difficulties facing research is that in general archeological cultures are either broader or narrower than each ethnic unit. The second difficulty is that an archeological culture and the archeological object do not speak. Therefore the discovery of what language we should say the user of an object spoke is really a task of the history of languages.

Gyorffy: Certainly the archeologist cannot make a skeleton speak, in the same way that it cannot be said about a dead man dressed in present-day, European clothing as to what language he spoke and to what ethnic group he belonged if there is no tell-tale sign. But it is precisely this that would interest experts the most. It is not primarily archeology, but primarily the historical sources, that provide an answer to this, something we must emphasize in deciding historical questions about the migration period, because present-day man is inclined to see Middle Age ethnic groups through the same glasses with which he conceives a people or a nation today, although in the early Middle Ages ethnic consciousness manifested itself in another form. Europe at the time of the migrations was a vast ethnic melting-pot, in which the various tribes had not yet definitely solidified into peoples, and each war brought completely new groupings with new names, into existence. It is also for this reason that as regards Eastern Europe--chiefly in the Byzantine sources--continually changing ethnic names appear, and we are unable to determine which peoples appearing later these ethnic names encompass. If we look at which peoples have been playing a role in the East Central European area from the beginning of our millenium (for example, Polich, Hungarian, or Croat), and if we look for these same peoples on the ethnographic maps of earlier centuries, we may find, amazingly, that either they did not exist, or, on the other hand, appear quite elsewhere, among other circumstances.

Hanak: What Gyorgy Gyorffy expounded concerning ethnic relations of the migrations between the 5th and the 10th century, about the ethno-genesis of the early Middle Ages, reinforces the methodological misgivings already indicated earlier. On the basis of this notion, is the "double conquest" theory, which has stirred so much debate in past years among both archeologists and historians, acceptable? In case of the uncertainty of interpretability or archeological finds, can the theory be proven according to which late Avar-period archeological finds in fact camouflage participants in an earlier, "first," Hungarian conquest?

Gyorffy: It follows what has been said that this proof is difficult, almost impossible. Archeologists have excavated large burial grounds, which are characterized by griffin-and-tendrill, bronze-cast, furnishings; it can also be said about the finds that we are dealing here with a largely equestrian population, but one already acquainted with the rudiments of agriculture. About the strata, it may also generally be said in what period this culture may be placed, in which century it appears and how long it lasted; but it is simply not possible to make them speak, and they do not reveal what language they spoke and to what ethnic group they belonged.

Makkai: There is a Byzantine memorandum from around 670, according to which the confederation of Bulgar tribes that lived on the steppe along the Black Sea disintegrated, and one part of it migrated to the Carpathian basin. Could there have been Magyars among these?

Györffy: Even before now it was known that various Uigur-Turkish, Bulgar tribes were among the subjects of the Avar Empire. Uigur Turks are also the Danubian Bulgars, whom under another name were also called Onogur or Onogundur. This ethnic name Onogur, however, is none other than the Ongr, Ungr, Hungarus, or Ungar name used by foreigners for the Magyars. That is, our ethnic name is traceable to the Bulgar-Turkic ethnic name Onogur. This, however, does not mean that every Onogur people spoke the Finno-Ugrian Hungarian language, for about the Danubian Onogur-Bulgars we know with absolute precision that they spoke a specific Bulgar-Turkic dialect; numerous inscriptions from their language have survived. Today we may take it as proven that in the Avar period a Bulgar-Turkic subgroup moved into the Carpathian basin, and that it belonged to those Onogurs that also played a role in the formation of the Magyars. But we cannot state that this Bulgar-Turkic subgroup that came here spoke a Finno-Ugrian language, or rather, if there were Hungarian-speakers among them, it was not they who determined the ethnic-linguistic aspect of the Carpathian basin.

Hanak: Laszlo Makkai referred above to a written memorandum. Up until now we have rather been enumerating archeological documentation. We must, however, match and confront these pieces of information with the evidence of Byzantine, Arab, and German sources that have been used and critically sifted many times for over a century.

Mocsy: In connection with Byzantine sources I would mention three examples, which also point to three modes of source criticism. The first is the description of Priskos, an important source of Hun history. He writes extraordinarily vividly about the court of Attila, for example. The work is also an extraordinarily valuable and very trustworthy source because, as an eye-witness, Priskos gives an account of an official visit he made to the Carpathian basin. (He went on a political mission to the Carpathian basin in the middle of the 5th century.) About the inhabitants of territories lying north of the Danube he writes that they spoke the language of the Huns and Goths, whereas the Latin language was known only to those who traded with the Romans in Balkan markets.

The author of the second Byzantine source is Prokopius, the last great figure of Greek historiography from the 6th century. What Prokopius writes relative to the Carpathian basin, however, is totally speculative, something invented, I might say "at his desk." He writes, for example, that the region north of the Danube was completely uninhabited, although from other sources we know precisely what peoples lived there.

Finally, the third group of sources. The different chronographies concerning the history of the Avar-Byzantine wars furnish important data; these, on the other hand, are exceptionally laconic, exclusively setting down historical events noted next to each date.

Gyorffy: For the most part the remaining groups of sources contain references concerning the peoples found here in connection with some warlike conflict or political action. Numerous contemporary sources recall the Magyar conquest, and in these those peoples also figure who actually fought with the Magyars. The Annals of Fulda, for example, mention the Bulgars, Moravians, and Franks. I emphasize here the Mohammedan sources, the majority of them in Arabic, and a small number in Persian; these described commerce-oriented geography of the territories and their inhabitants which were reached by their traders like the peoples living in the region of the Black Sea, the boundaries of the Etelkoz territory inhabited by the Magyars, and the neighboring people. They state that on the Danube the Magyars were neighbors to the Bulgars, under their old name the Nandors, and they also reveal that between the Bulgars--whose rule extended to the southern half of the Alföld--and the Moravians there was a 10 day's journey over uninhabited territory. Then they describe the Slavs in such a way that based on their information we have knowledge of the greater part of the Danube valley ethnic group.

If we compare the Arab sources with a few Western geographical descriptions of a similar character, the picture becomes even clearer. Around the 830's a Bavarian geographer familiarized us with the peoples living to the north of the Danube line, but does not only enumerate them by tribes, but also states how many civitates--fortified districts--they comprised. (Each civitas corresponds to one clan.) We know that the Bulgars had 5 civitates north of the Danube. He even mentions the name of the Etelkoz Magyars, too, although he does not mention other such peoples who entered this area only later, for example, the Pechenegs, Cumanians, and Vlachs.

Hanak: We have become familiar with the most competent sources, the Byzantines, Arabs, and Germans. But we also have such a source, which is Hungarian, and whose central theme is the Conquest and contemporaneous relations. This is Anonymous. Anonymous has also influenced Hungarian public knowledge and historiography. His impact may also be measured in these two examples: in 1975, 12000 copies of Anonymous that appeared in an artistic facsimile edition in Hungarian translation were sold out in 4 weeks. (Since then a newer edition has also found a ready market.) The second: not only in our, but also in the historiography of our neighboring countries--in Slovakia, in Romania--Anonymous is still a basic source today, indeed, almost a Bible. How then do we stand with regard to the value of Anonymous as a source?

Gyorffy: It must not be forgotten that Anonymous, signing himself Master P., lived 300 years after the Magyar conquest; he did not have the sources written about the Conquest that are available to a present-day historian. If he consulted older books, these were primarily the Bible, or some ancient author (for example, Justinian's description of the Scythians), but concerning relations around the Conquest only completely terse sources were available to him. Granting this, he wanted to give an interesting history of the Conquest of the type that was also being cultivated in 12th century France. This genre, as a matter of fact, sprouted from the soil of knightly culture, and through it they wanted to enliven histories that were read in court, and

to win approval with them. This genre was the romantic epic. As is apparent even from the adjective "romantic," its author did not strive to write authentic, pragmatic history, but rather to entertain. Anonymous, however, also has some social comments to make about his own age. He gave numerous Magyar leaders a part to play in his work, and in several cases he mentions that the descendents of these leaders are still living and in possession of the land that they occupied at the Conquest. Anonymous relates these mini-conquests in a very interesting and colorful way. He recounts in numerous places how, for example, a certain leader, the ancestor of a nobleman of Anonymous' time, occupied that piece of land on which his descendents still live. And it is precisely in this that the importance to his contemporaries of what he has to say is. We must imagine that Anonymous, as King Bela III's clerk, heard the family histories, and the various rumors of noble society and the royal retinue in which he was at home concerning the nobles' ancestors who lived 300 years earlier, and that he attempted to pull together some sort of romantic epic from these. Since family oral tradition handed down from generation to generation modified over 300 years has no serious historical value, neither does Anonymous have value as an authentic source.

Hanak: One may read this statement in the introductory study of the new Anonymous volume which in fact was written by Gyorgy Gyorffy. Anonymous therefore projected the family, nationality, and property relations of his own time back to the time of the Conquest. This is demonstrated by the fact that he even has peoples play a role who at that time were not there yet--or were no longer to be found in the Carpathian basin. On the one hand, he speaks about the fact that after the death of Attila the Romans occupied this territory, and that the Magyars allegedly encountered them at Veszprem; on the other hand, he has those Cumanians who settled in the country only in the second half of the 11th century move in already in the 9th century. The jumbled facts and confused chronology characterize the epic of Anonymous as an ahistorical, retrospective narrative, just like the other chroniclers.


Makkai: There is, however, one interesting point to Anonymous, which we have not mentioned before. He liked to deal with philology. He related a whole series of personal names with place names, albeit imaginatively. But the late illustrious representative of Hungarian linguistics, Istvan Knieza, developed a system with his research of place names that is both theoretically useful and methodologically outstanding. This system included river names and place names. According to this system of modern onomastics, how did the Carpathian basin appear sometime around 1000? The research sets forth three types of river names. The first category of river names comprises the Szamos, Maros, Koros, Tisza, Drava, Szava, Temes, Danube, and Rata. Without exception, these go back to Roman times, or to a period even older than that; there is, however a flaw in them. All are such that it is possible to prove about them only that they came into the Hungarian and also the Romanian language through Slav mediation. Therefore these river names did not come into the languages of the Magyars, Romanians, or local Germans directly from the Pannonian, Illyrian, or other peoples, but were taken over from the Slavs. The medium and smaller rivers derive only from peoples with whom we are familiar beginning with the 9th century. To be more precise from Slavs and Magyars. First, a series of Slavic examples: Beszterce, Zsitva, Rabca.... I could continue. Among these there is an interesting, peculiar, and special type, such as the

Kukullo-Ternava designation, where there is a double place-name given: Kukullo means the same as Kokenyes, as does Ternava in Slavic. In an interesting way, the Romanians took Ternava over from the local Slavs, while the Magyars name it Kukullo, a Hungarian word of Turkish origin, which means the same. Besides these Slavic names, the whole Carpathian basin is full of countless Hungarian names, such as Er, Berettyo, and Aranka. But let me name more typical cases in Transylvania: Nyarad, Lapos, Aranyos, which in Romanian, for example, are Nyirazs, a borrowing of the old form of Nyaragy, Lopus from Lapos, and this likewise from the Hungarian, and Aries from Aranyos, also from the Hungarian. Therefore the medium and small rivers were already named by those peoples that are still in existence today.

Gyorffy: True, this is the situation with river names, but with another group of place-names, the names of localities--village, city, and castle names--we are in quite a different position. Students of the origin of place-names often view the present names as the bequest of some long-gone people. According to the most recent research, the place-name material of historic Hungary generally can not be traced to pre-Conquest times. We can prove this by the fact that the Conquest-period Magyars seized territories to the east and north of the Danube from the Bulgars and Moravians at the cost of great battles, whereas Pannonia fell into their hands, so to speak, without a fight. We might expect that the 9th century place-names of Pannonia would remain and live on in the Hungarian place-name material. This, however, has not occurred. Every place-name dates from after the Conquest. This points to the fact that place-names are not useful for the establishment of any sort of continuity.

Hanak: During our long exchange of ideas we have spoken about new findings of archeology, historiography, and linguistics, and we received for the most part concordant responses to the question of whether in the 500 years following the collapse of the Roman Empire there was demonstrable continuity between the population of the former provinces and the peoples who lived here in the 9th century. Continuity--whether this refers to kinship with the Huns, or to the "empire of Great Moravia," or to descent from the Dacians--was invented by chroniclers and writers of history. More precisely: they clothed ancient sayings and myths in historical garb. It was only the romantic historiography of the first half of the 19th century that elevated these myths to scientific rank, to arouse the nation, to excite interest in the heroic past, and to make the past romantically heroic. In this capacity, in the process of the development of national consciousness 150 or 200 years ago, they doubtless acquired a certain positive propagandistic influence. Scholarship, however, has now gotten beyond myths; genuine self-knowledge--we may also say the self-knowledge of the Danube region--directly demands a historical critique of these myths. We can reconstruct the migration-period settlement, ethnic, and cultural relations of the Danube region, and the framework of our common history with scientific accuracy and faithfulness to the facts only if we research from the historicizing purpose of legalizing present power relations. The international and internal power relations of this region will not in any case be decided in debates over indigenoussness and historical priority.

Ethnic Groups in the Carpathian Basin Between
1st and 12th Centuries



Key: Kvád--Quadi
 Romai--Romans
 Kelta--Celts
 Szarmata--Sarmatians
 Dak--Dacians
 Illír--Illyrians
 Gepida--Gepids
 Morva--Moravians
 Bajor--Bavarians
 Besenyo--Pechenegs
 Uz-Kun--Uz-Cumans

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SITUATION LEADING TO TREATY OF TRIANON EXAMINED

Budapest HISTORIA in Hungarian No 1, 1979 pp 5-7

[Article by Zsuzsa L. Nagy, doctor of historical science, chief scientific researcher MTA TTI (Hungarian Academy of Science Institute of History): "The Paris Peace Treaties, 1919-1920"]

[Text] Versailles, whose splendor was created by Louis XIV, the Sun King, and where Marie Antoinette lived the role of a peasant ideal in a small artificial village, Sevres, world-famous for its porcelain, Neuilly and St. Germain, which are connected to Paris by Metro, are favorite points of interest for tourists and excursionists today. It was in these charming towns 60 years ago, at the end of the First World War, that representatives of the defeated side, the former Central Powers, signed the peace treaties.

The Claims of the Victors and Their Allies

The peace conference began on 18 January 1919, amidst ceremonial trappings. The spirit of recrimination and revenge dominated the "French atmosphere" provided by the site. This was also expressed by the opening date: nearly 50 years earlier, on that day, on French soil, the then-victorious Prussians proclaimed the Emire as the symbol of the birth of a unified Germany. It was not an empty phrase, therefore, when Raymond Poincare, the representative of the French Republic, declared in his opening speech: "now the only thing left for us is to reap all the fruits of this victory along with you." The former Central Powers had to pay for defeat with the loss of territories, reparations, a reduction in armed forces, etc.

The "five-in-hand" of the victorious "entente cordials" (the well-known term entente comes from this) was composed of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. It was Wilson, the American President, and Prime Ministers Lloyd George of England, Clemenceau of France, and Orlando of Italy--the Big Four, as they then were called--who made the decisions in European affairs. The leading statesmen and foreign ministers of the five Great Powers formed the Council of Ten. Territorial questions, new political boundaries, were discussed in this committee, presided over by French Foreign Minister Andre Tardieu. The bases of the system regulating the fate of the German colonies and certain territories of the Turkish Empire were worked out by English general Jan Christian Smuts, a member of the

Cabinet and later prime minister of the Union of South Africa. (Smuts is well known to us: at the beginning of April, 1919, he was sent by the peace conference to Budapest, to negotiate with Bela Kun.)

Only the "Allied and Associated Powers" were present at the negotiations; from East Central Europe and the Balkans only Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State (after 1923, Yugoslavia), and Greece. The vanquished were invited only to accept and then sign the prepared peace treaty documents.

Even during the war, in the interest of securing allies, the Entente signed a series of promissory notes, which they did not want to fully honor in 1919.

What were these "bills?" On 16 August 1915 England, France, and Russia promised to Serbia [the territory of] Bosnia, Herzegovina, part of Dalmatia, Slovenia, Croatia, Fiume, the Bacska, and the Banat—that is, parts of the Monarchy and of historic Hungary. On 17 August 1916, in order that Romania not only make a declaration of neutrality, but also that it enter the war against the Central Powers, the Entente recognized the claim of the Romanian government to Bucovina, Dobrudja, Bessarabia, Transylvania, the Trans-Tisza region (up to Debrecen, including Szeged and Oroshaza), and the Banat, which had earlier been offered to Serbia. Italy joined the Entente in return for the offer of part of Austria (South Tyrol) made in the 26 April 1915 agreement as well as Gorizia and the territories and islands around Trieste inhabited by Italians, but also those inhabited by Slavs. Later the Italians demanded Fiume for themselves, and also pressed claims in the Balkans. When the Allies accepted the emigre Czechoslovak government as an "associated power," they at the same time recognized the right of the Czechoslovaks to their independence "within the historic boundaries of their territories." In 1919 the debate centered on how these "historic boundaries" were to be understood. Within the plans of the Entente there figured the restoration of the unity and independence of Poland, which was carved into three pieces as parts of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the Tsarist Empire. From these promises and goals it followed that by the time the peace conference convened, the outlines of the territorial decisions had already been firmly drawn. This, naturally, did not preclude further heated debates, for the new boundaries had to be drawn in ethnically mixed territories, a difficult task even in itself. To this was added the burden of power interests and, in more than one case, ignorance.

"The Big Four"

The leading politicians, who made decisions on the recommendations of experts, in many cases did not even know where to look on a map for the territories under discussion. Nobody was shocked that Lloyd George, for example, mixed up Salgotarjan and Pecs, which at least was a mistake within one country.

President Wilson laid down the basis of the peace conference; we are no longer making a peace for larger or smaller territories; we are making a peace for the peoples. (Opening speech of French Prime Minister G. Clemenceau, 18 January 1919.)

England wanted to weaken Germany's colonial and oceanic power, and laid claim to the former German colonies. The main concern of the British on the European continent was that no other rival replace the German one--not even exceedingly powerful France. The French saw the pledge of their security in a surrounded Germany rendered politically harmless, as well as in the creation of a powerful Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Italy wanted to extend its influence into the Danube basin, and wished to advance to leading power in the Adriatic and the Balkans. The English and the French--devising plans for the overthrow of the Soviet system--would have liked to bring under their "protectorate" the oil of Baku and the southern regions of the former Tsarist Empire.

The United States was not interested in Europe. The majority isolationists (the proponents of isolation) in the American Congress strenuously objected to getting entangled in affairs, which were baffling to them, over there. They were interested in the expansion of the American sphere of interest in the Far East, in China and Siberia, as well as in South America. Indeed, after the signing of the German peace the United States withdrew from the peace conference, and did not sign the individual peaces together with its fellow-allies, but separately, nor did it become a member of the League of Nations.

After the victory of the Revolution, Russia quit the Entente, and launched a war against the imperialist peace, reparations, and territorial conquest. Following its example, the then-emerging international Communist movement wanted to create a new order and a new peace by the creation of soviet republics and by an alliance of these. In this way, then, the sweet fruit of victory turned bitter for the Entente; they forced their decisions on the vanquished with greater difficulty. The existence of a socialist state--Soviet Russia--brought a qualitative change in international relations. Although the Soviet government was not invited to Paris, since the isolation of Soviet Russia was an important goal of the conference, it still had to be reckoned with.

The New State Boundaries

The peace was signed by Germany on 28 June 1919 at Versailles (the table at which the ceremony took place stands there even today in the building that has been transformed into a museum); by Austria on 10 September 1919 at St. Germain; by Bulgaria on 29 November 1919 at Neuilly; by Hungary on 4 June 1920 at Versailles, in the palace named the Great Trianon; and by Turkey on 19 August 1920 at Sevres. The German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Turkish Empire vanished from the map at this time, to cede their place to new and re-fashioned states.

The Versailles peace returned Alsace-Lorraine to the French, which they had lost in 1871; it placed the Rhine district under the temporary occupation of the Great Powers, and demilitarized the zone; and it awarded smaller territories to Belgium.

the Entente wanted to strengthen Poland not only vis-a-vis Germany, but vis-a-vis Soviet Russia as well; and on account of their anti-Soviet policy they supported the independent Baltic States. Under pressure from Lloyd George, though, they did not award Danzig to Poland--the two formed only a customs union--but they placed it as a free city under the protectorate of the League of Nations, and the Saar district. They attached significant parts of the former German empire to Poland.

The Austrian and Hungarian treaties fixed the new features of the Danube basin. Through these there took shape primarily Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and in part, Poland as well. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the peace conference created the new states out of nowhere. For the East European process of nation-building, of the creation of independent statehood, had already been disrupting the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy for decades, and had created unrest in the Balkans.

Austria had to renounce not only former Czech and Moravian provinces of the Monarchy, but also German-inhabited territories (the Sudeten region), in favor of Czechoslovakia, while former Adriatic territories of the Habsburg Empire and South Tyrol (the Adige) went to Yugoslavia and Italy, respectively. On the basis of the October, 1920, referendum, the southern zone of Carinthia and Klagenfurt, despite Yugoslav claims, remained under Austrian jurisdiction. Despite Austrian demands, on the other hand, the peace conference awarded Csorna and Szentgotthard to Hungary, in order in this way to "soften" its decisions on the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border for the Hungarians.

In the matter of possession of the Burgenland, heated conflicts erupted between Austria and Hungary. The Hungarian counter-revolutionary system supported the bands that were swarming here, comprised mostly of former members of the detachments, in order to impede the implementation of the peace of St. Germain. Simultaneously with this, Pecs and part of Baranya, still held by Yugoslavs, was likewise awarded to Hungary. Thus the Bethlen government, exploiting this situation, succeeded in getting the December 14 referendum liquidating the band-actions and also the decision about the fate of Sopron, as well as the evacuation of the illegally occupied territories by the Yugoslavs.

Fiume (present-day Rijeka) became a free city based on the 1920 Treaty of Rapallo, which of course did not end the Italian-Yugoslav dispute. Finally, however, under the terms of the Treaty of Rome the harbor came under Italian jurisdiction in 1924.

Point 88 of the Austrian peace treaty prohibited the union of Germany and Austria (a similar point also figured in the German peace treaty), and also prescribed that the name Austria had to be used instead of German Austria.

The Hungarian peace treaty was given the name "Trianon" by contemporaries in order to distinguish it from the German one, since both were signed at Versailles. The representatives of the Great Powers heard the verbal presentations of the Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav peace delegations

in the early days of February, 1919. Their debates were primarily with Bratianu. Romania, however, stuck to the 1916 treaty, although it had violated its provisions in signing a separate peace in 1918, and only 2 days before the German surrender again declared war on the Central Powers. The Romanian government opposed most vehemently and for the longest time the inclusion of the paragraphs guaranteeing the rights of minorities in the peace treaties: it considered this as interference in Romanian internal affairs. The Romanian army, in the course of intervention against the Soviet Republic, occupied the Trans-Tisza region, Budapest, and other territories. Eventually, in the summer of 1920, it withdrew, in order to get Bessarabia in exchange and at the expense of Soviet Russia.

Lloyd George pressed for a referendum in Transylvania; the American experts did not want to award Szatmarnemet, Nagyvarad, or Arad to Romania. In the complicated system of different compromises, which only partly concerned the Hungarian problems, that Hungarian-Romanian border took shape very largely according to Romanian demands. To Romania went Bucovina, Transylvania as well as territories lying to the north of it, part of the Banat, and from Bulgaria, southern Dobrudja. In the area of Pozsony the peace conference decided in favor of the Czechoslovaks; on American recommendation it awarded Szeged to Hungary.

In the debate over the Czechoslovak border, the German and Polish sections elicited much greater interest than the Hungarian. Though the powerful Czechoslovak lobby of the English foreign ministry, the Foreign Office, wanted to "let our Czechoslovak friends have what they want," nevertheless, Vac, Sarospatok, Satoraljaújhely, Tokaj, the city and coal basin of Salgotarjan, Miskolc and its environs, as well as Csap, remained in Hungarian hands--contrary to Czechoslovak demands.

Inasmuch as the economic ramifications of the peace treaty represented a general, defined ideas, these ideas were those of France and of Clemenceau.

(Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
New York, 1920)

A long debate went on concerning the fate of Sub-Carpathia, since the Great Powers in no way wanted to strengthen the Ukraine with this territory. Even the possibility of attaching this politically and economically backward and socially undeveloped territory to Hungary came up. Finally, it became part of Czechoslovakia. Prague would have liked to establish for itself the leading role in the Danube basin. For this reason it insisted again and again, to no avail, that it receive an outlet to the Adriatic Sea by carving out a piece of Austrian and Hungarian territories (this was known in the period as its corridor-plan--linking Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). Possession of the Silesian and Salgotarjan coal basins, moreover, would have made it possible for them to utilize the indispensable fuel as a political weapon.

Though the peace conference informed the interested parties of the state boundaries on 13 June 1919, it did not invite the Revolutionary Ruling Council to Paris, because by this act it would have recognized the Soviet Republic. The Hungarian peace treaty was signed by the representatives of the counter-revolutionary government only on 4 June 1920.

Out of the great transformation of the Danube basin only two states finally emerged with minimal national minorities: Austria and Hungary. The situation of minorities, on the other hand, became a general problem of the whole area, because the provisions of the peace treaties concerning the rights of minorities remained for the most part on paper.

The pertinent parts of the Bulgarian, as well as the Turkish peace fixed the changes in the Balkans. The Sultan signed the treaty, according to which, inter alia, Anatolia, Eastern Thrace, and other territories, were awarded to Greece. The "Young Turk" movement, however, under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, overthrew the monarchy, and launched a diplomatic and military war against the peace treaty. Thus, then, on 23 August 1923, in Lausanne in Switzerland, a new Turkish peace was made. Turkey was able to keep the above-mentioned territories, while the Straits of Bosphorus were declared an international waterway. The German and Turkish peaces had significant consequences even outside the [European] Continent. Germany had to renounce its former colonies, Turkey its near Eastern territories; the map of Asia Minor and the Near East was completely transformed.

Among Germany's Central African colonies Tanganyika, as well as part of Cameroun and Togo, came under British jurisdiction, while the larger part of the latter two came under French authority, and Ruanda a protectorate of Belgium. The Union of South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and England divided South-West Africa, as well as Samoa, New Guinea, and islands lying north of the equator in the western part of the Pacific Ocean. Among former Turkish vilajets, Iraq, Mesopotamia, and Palestine came under British rule, Syria under French.

The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the peoples we wish to see secure and guaranteed, should possess the widest possibility for insuring their autonomous development.

(American President Wilson's message to Congress on 8 January 1918, 10th point of the Fourteen Points)

The peace conference was still in session when the first doubts and misgivings began to arise: did the arrangement signify a guarantee for a lasting peace? How legitimate the question was is shown by this: at the end of March, 1919, Lloyd George argued in a confidential memorandum that by their decisions they were laying the foundation for a German-Hungarian-Bulgarian-Turkish joining of forces.

It is certain that the policy and methods of the Entente contaminated the political atmosphere of the Danube basin and the Balkans, and created hostile relations among a series of countries. The transition to nationhood, the birth of the new states, was accomplished under circumstances such that every part affected felt and suffered their positive and negative consequences.

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REVOLUTIONS OF 1918, 1919 CAUSES, AIMS STUDIED

Budapest HISTORIA in Hungarian No 1, 1979 pp 10-11

[Article by Tibor Hajdu, doctor of historical science, chief scientific researcher with MTA TTI (Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of History): "Reflections on the Two Revolutions of 1918-1919"]

[Text] Our public life, our literature, and our historiography have in the past 2 decades done much to immortalize the memory of the [Hungarian] Soviet Republic and to clarify its history. Where our way of looking at things still for the most part falls short of a faithful, truthful representation is in the relation of these two revolutions, 1918 and 1919. A rigid separation, a contraposition, is a relic of then-current debates, of the then-current view. If we look at the published literature and at textbooks, we find primarily the accentuation and misinterpretation of the bourgeois character of the bourgeois democratic revolution.

Bourgeoisie and Revolutions

No one denies that the working class played a decisive role in both revolutions. Nor is it disputable that the October, 1918, revolution was a bourgeois democratic revolution. This does not mean that the bourgeoisie stood at its head, nor that it would have expressed primarily bourgeois interests. The bourgeoisie that had taken shape in the dualist Monarchy and had become a sharer in power already saw more danger than benefit for itself in the revolution.

The bourgeoisie in Hungary judged that the worker and peasant movement, and the radical intelligentsia, was too strong to be utilized as a harmless tool in the struggle for power positions. It did not even seriously support the extension of the franchise, since that would have strengthened primarily those nationality parties that were endangering the system of the dualist Monarchy that was beneficial to the Hungarian and German bourgeoisie.

War preparations, then the First World War, bound big capital to the ancient regime with new ties: alongside unrivalled big business, there also grew the direct share in political power of a bourgeoisie that was even more

unequivocally pro-war and pro-German than the landowning class. The largest barons among the war-profiteers received noble titles and at the same time a leading role in the new government organs of the war economy; moreover, even within the government, the direct representation of the men of big capital was growing. In the second half of the war the growing specter of the Russian revolution, and the strike movements, and bloodshed, bound the bourgeoisie even more tightly to the war system.

The representatives of the "democratic" bourgeoisie (Vilmos Vazsonyi, Bela Foldes) one after the other abandoned the camp of democracy before the revolution, nor did the representatives of its liberal wing (Istvan Barczy, Miksa Fenyo, Pal Sandor) support the National Council, but the Hadik government established in opposition to it, or else they remained neutral. Even the democrats Lajos Beck and Ferenc Harrer, who stood close to Karolyi, backed out at the last minute (although they at least proclaimed their support after the victory). The sole genuine "bourgeois" member of the National Council was Lajos Hatvany; but a few weeks later even he abandoned the policy of the National Council when it began to consider the limiting of capital.

After the victory of the bourgeois democratic revolution, at the end of 1918, the bourgeoisie participated with conditional support in the Karolyi government. It gave this passive support previously and even afterwards to every regime that was based on bourgeois private property. It supported the Karolyi government, as long as it hoped to get from it the retention of the nationality territories and the prevention of the socialist revolution. During the New Year government crisis, the big bourgeoisie supported Karolyi's right-wing opposition (Marton Lovaszy), and its plan for a "Bourgeois Alliance," but during the preparations for elections it formed an independent bourgeois party.

Among the governing parties the Radical Party, which started out as a narrow avant-guard of intelligentsia, attracted a significant number of the petty as well as middle bourgeoisie of Budapest in the first weeks of the revolution. Since, however, Oszkar Jaszi and Pal Szende did not budge from their opposition to big capital, they again deserted them.

The big and middle bourgeoisie, as well as the peasantry, played an important, but fundamentally passive, role in both revolutions. As a matter of fact, in both revolutions these same two active forces stood in opposition to each other. On one side, the socialist working class, on the other side the counterrevolutionary state apparatus, with its gentry and its support base, as well as the officer corps, belonging to it.

The state officials, the gentlemanly middle class, were defending a system that embodied the historical compromise between the landowning class and the modern bourgeoisie. In the first months of the revolution they supported the Karolyi government because they were able to suppress the peasant movements and to act against the nationalities. After January, 1919, however, they placed their hopes more and more in a right counterrevolutionary turn.

The main cause of their about-face was not that for which they later blamed the Karolyi and then the Berinkei government: that those two, competing with the revolution, adopted expressly anticapitalist plans (the question of a radical property tax or the nationalization of big industry), instead of stopping with a clearly bourgeois democratic base. On the contrary: though such plans, violating the sanctity of private property, were in principle foreign to the state apparatus, this apparatus was not so tightly tied to big capital that these plans would have affected it directly. It was not primarily certain threats of "socialization," but certain bourgeois democratic reforms, that alarmed the state apparatus and its social base: the separation of church and state, universal suffrage, the granting of equal rights to the nationalities, land distribution, etc. Karolyi, therefore, definitely had to affront his own state apparatus of which he could rely only on the working class and, to a certain degree, the common soldiers. Partly for this reason and partly because it could not do otherwise, the government put up with having the workers' and soldiers' councils--like a state within a state--function as a second power, while by this it ultimately embittered the state apparatus and especially the officer corps.

Counter-Revolutionary Camp

What was the situation after the proclamation of the Soviet Republic? Of whom was the camp of active counter-revolution composed? In the various counter-revolutionary movements, there stood at the head that part of the officer corps that was not willing to give up its counter-revolutionary aim even for the sake of defending the homeland. Its position was reinforced by the fact that the Soviet Republic was compelled to re-activate the officer corps that had been dismissed after the bourgeois revolution. Gendarme, police, and border-guard officers and junior officers played a special role, followed by administrative, railroad, and other civil servants, and priests. The mass of rural insurrectionists was composed of rich peasants, in addition to those named above. The big bourgeoisie and the aristocracy were isolated, and supported the counter-revolution from the background by material means and through connections with the Entente. I do not wish by this to make the bourgeoisie appear apolitical, for its sympathies were with the counter-revolution; but by virtue of its situation it was not qualified to direct it. A not only characteristic, but even symbolic, example was Manfred Weiss' attempted suicide a day or two after the proclamation of the Soviet Republic.

The democratic bourgeoisie, the forces of the fallen government--the Karolyi party, the Radical Party, and even the leaders of Nagyatadi's Smallholders' Party, with few exceptions--did not take part in the counter-revolutionary movements, in spite of the fact that that the Entente would have liked precisely that. For this reason one must ponder whether the Soviet government did not take a politically mistaken step when it forcefully arrested several former Karolyi party ministers.

The Revolution Against the Peace

One of the most important questions in the history of the 1918-1919 revolutions is the nationality question. The revolutions could not be carried

out within a framework of the nationalities because there simply was no such framework. The dissolution of the Monarchy and, with it, of historic Hungary, provided the background of the revolutions in nationality history. The fates, the courses, of the two revolutions, are linked by the circumstance that they followed each other in an identical foreign policy situation, in the years of the unfolding of the nationality catastrophe, although to the nationality question itself they gave not only divergent, but nearly contradictory answers, and this arose not just from the differing characters of their social programs.

It was not enough that the nature of the situation was tragic, it was not enough that the attitude of victorious imperialism was doubly spiteful toward everything Magyar and revolutionism; the optimism of the revolutions turned toward a mirage of illusions, when perhaps "stark realism" would have been useful. But neither the idealism of the revolutions, nor the traditionally obdurate self-deception of Hungarian public opinion, permitted the otherwise well-informed revolutionary governments to see the truth in a realistic way. But has there ever been a revolution that was not given strength by the fact that it directed its gaze toward the hopeful image of a happy future?

The aster revolution was a revolution of the peace. If it was able to shorten the long-pointless spilling of blood by even one or two days, if it was able to save only 1,000-2,000 Hungarian lives--its whole genesis originated from the struggle peace waged by the parties and adherents of the National Council.

The aster revolution had pacifist base with Wilsonian ideals. Since it was delayed, its pacifism partly lost its significance and its worth in the eyes of the enemy, which 1 year earlier would still have honored a separate peace. In the moment of defeat, Hungarian pacifism could expect only acknowledgement, no longer any compensation.

The Karolyi government came to power in no small measure because it was a peace party. The Hungarian government, as a bourgeois democratic government (in which the Social Democrats also took part), without active Great Power support, did not launch a war against all of its neighbors after defeat in the world war. (Neither did the counter-revolution a year later, which could not be accused of a love of peace.) It was precisely politicians with a suitable mental attitude and past that were necessary for the forced acquiescence, and not the other way around. It is not accidental that while there was some hope that the victors would reward Karolyi's pacifism with better peace conditions, even its right-wing opposition worked on behalf of its influence rather than for its overthrow.

When it became clear that the fate of Hungary was decided by the loss of the war, though public opinion began to turn against the government, even the counter-revolution, without an adequate alternative, persisted in anti-government agitation. One of the contradictions of the foreign policy of the bourgeois democratic government was that, on a bourgeois base, at least for the short run, there was no other possibility then to be integrated into

the New Europe, to win the sympathy of victors and neighbors. In a democratic state, on the other hand, in elections that guarantee freedom even to the opposition, it was impossible to defend such a policy, particularly to the Independence Party, whose main base was the Hungarian Alföld.

Revolution and War

The disillusionment was increased by the fact that Wilson did not live up to expectations in him; not only Karolyi, but his English as well as American diplomatic supporters, were also disappointed in him. Karolyi's Wilsonian illusion may be summarized in two points: First: he believed that Wilsonism, which he believed to be the ruling principle of the Western alliance, would guarantee a just peace founded on harmony among nations, without territorial acquisitions or reparations, and would preclude the possibility of a new war. Secondly: he persuaded himself that Wilsonian "national self-determination" was compatible with the maintenance of historic Hungary, without significant territorial changes, forgetting that under self-determination the West, for the time being, understood the self-determination of its own allies.

In defense of Karolyi and of truth, let us make it clear that there is no question about Wilsonian having been a mere bluff, as was believed for a long time after Trianon, or about Karolyi's having been a naive dilettante, who swallowed the humbug. Karolyi--and Wilson--saw further than his time, feeling that, after half a century, the capitalist world would also accept national self-determination and the system of new types of relations among national states as a fundamental principle--although not everywhere predominant. He erred when he believed in its instantaneous and literal realization.

Karolyi more and more perceived that the road that led to a league of nations was a rough one. In his despair in the last weeks of his presidency, he experimented with a democratic but militantly nationalistic, policy similar to that of the neighboring national states: he strengthened the Székely division, promulgated the slogan "no, no, never," and tried to exploit diplomatic conflicts. But in the light of the lightning-bolt of the Vyx-memorandum, he had to perceive that his system was not capable of a new orientation. They served up a bourgeois democratic national policy to the victors--the losers had to choose between nationalism and internationalism. The socialist-pacifist orientation of Karolyi and the majority of his government facilitated the handling of power over to the camp of internationalism.

The Soviet Republic, instead of negotiating with the bourgeois governments, chose the route of patriotic war and of revolutionary propaganda carried beyond the national frontiers. We can have only great admiration for the heroism of the undertaking, and also for the political, diplomatic, and military execution of it. We cannot explain the cause of its defeat by tactical mistakes--the enemy committed greater mistakes--but solely by the otherwise erroneously assessed international situation, which shaped up more and more favorably for the Hungarian revolution.

The Soviet Republic did not start a war. It made preparations for national defense and for waiting for international assistance. Its military actions were for the most part characterized by prudence and competence, its nationality policy by the sincere aspiration that the non-Magyar population feel itself the equal of the Magyar in every respect. It is undeniable, however, that it was unable to overcome fundamentally unfavorable givens.

The Nationality Question in 1919

The nationality policy of the Soviet Republic was a proletarian policy. It combined proletarian socialist policy with the nationality liberation struggle and in this way achieved great results in the area of winning over the various classes of the Hungarian nation. It also exercised a great attractive influence on the organized workers of the neighboring nations, but it could not find an echo in the peasant-petty bourgeois strata of the neighboring countries, which were more responsive than the workers to a lively anti-Hungarian nationalism spurred by new independent statehood. For the most part, however, these latter social strata comprised the majority of the population and the manpower of the army there.

But without the faith placed in world revolution, the proclamation of the Soviet Republic would have been inconceivable. And it is true that the Soviet Republic derived great strength from this no longer belief, but illusion, the illusory nature of which is superfluous to demonstrate today, that the victory of socialism automatically solves the nationality question, or at least offers a guarantee of its solution.

The example of the Slovak Soviet Republic well demonstrates the illusion of an automatic solution to the nationality question. Among the workers and parts of the peasantry of eastern Slovakia, many sympathized with the idea of socialism. Many enthusiastically received the proclamation of the Slovak Socialist Republic, which harmonized completely with the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the Communist International. It is a question, however, from the standpoint of national self-determination whether national self-determination can be realized in one part of a country, whether it be eastern or western. Is it a suitable moment for national self-determination when two warring armies occupy a divided province? In such a situation, is a revolutionary socialist policy fully compatible with national self-determination? The question is not made irrelevant by the fact that we know that the Hungarian Red Army did not have expansionist aims in Slovakia, it had not other goal than the liberation of classes and nationalities from every sort of oppression.

The limits of and serious problems with the solubility of the nationality question do not obscure the greatness of the proletarian revolution. For other social systems have been even less able to solve these problems. The socialist system could not work miracles even then.

OPERATION OF DISSIDENT PUBLISHING HOUSE EXAMINED

London DZIENNIK POLSKI in Polish 29 Sep 79 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Mirosław Chojecki and Z. A. by GLOS correspondent, with foreword by Andrzej J. Chilecki]

[Text] The West German papers noted that the TIN DRUM by Gunter Grass has finally appeared in Warsaw. It was not a big enterprise, only 2,000 copies. One should not be surprised, however, for it was published by the NOW Independent Publishing House outside the jurisdiction of the censorship office.

The vigorous publishing house has broken the seven seals of the Polish regime censorship which did not allow the appearance of the TIN DRUM in the bookstores. Similarly, the ANIMAL FARM by George Orwell, TOO LOUD LONELINESS by Bohumil Hrabal, and UNDERGROUND LITERATURE by Jozef Pilsudski, among others, managed to go around the "disgusting little monster" on Mysia St in Warsaw.

The existence of NOW is an effective protest against those "who arrest books and arrest people, who devastate culture and devastate the elementary order of human existence, who muzzle lips and force out a gesture, which is a shout." I found these words in RETURN HOME by Wiktor Woroszyński (London: Polonia Book Fund, 1979). One could have hardly said it better.

During its 2-year existence NOW has published over 50 titles in 300 to 5,000 copies. The aim of this publishing house is to offer the readers publications which cannot appear in official publishing houses due to their content or because of the names of their authors.

First NOW publications focused on "drawer literature" and texts rejected by the censorship office. Later its publishing activity became more systematic: 50 percent for domestic authors and the rest for foreign authors. NOW has published 11 issues of the quarterly ZAPIS and 6 issues of PULS, a literary magazine.

SELECTIONS FROM KULTURA '78 (prepared with the assistance of its Paris-based editorial staff!) rapidly disappeared as was the case with MOSCOW-PETUSHKI by Venedikt Erofeev (reprint of the book, published by the Kontra Publishing House in London) and BLACK POLONAISE by Kazimierz Wierzyński.

Among popular books, circulating now in Poland are A PULP by Jerzy Andrzejewski which was published to commemorate the author's 70th birthday and ORDINARY APOCALYPSE, a thriller, by Tadeusz Konwicki.

These are only some of the published titles. Soon will appear poems by Jacek Bierezin, Jerzy Ficowski, Osip Mandelshtam, and the fourth collection of poems by Czeslaw Milosz.

The NOW prospectus reads: "For the first time in the history of People's Poland there have been regularly published printings without permission, seals, signatures, without censorship. Our activity is open and in full accordance with the legal acts established by the authorities, and yet our great problem is the Security Service, which confiscates any found copy of our publications. The criminal activity of the Security Service is very bothersome to us and to our readers. However, the lack of any legal bases for prosecution allows the development of publishing initiatives."

The Independent Publishing House has as its objective a situation in which the free word will not be stopped by the barrier of the state information and publishing monopoly. It will fulfill its goals if supported by society. The success of NOW depends on the availability of texts, help in distribution and acquiring materials and polygraphic equipment.

It is the duty of Polish immigrants to offer wide financial assistance to the opposition movement at home. The fate of the free word in Poland is in our hands.

To the readers of TYDZIEN POLSKI we offer an interview with the people who manage NOW: Miroslaw Chojecki (a chemist, fired from his job at the Center of Nuclear Research in Swierk near Warsaw for his activity in the Committee for the Defense of Workers) and a person, identified by the letters Z. A. This interview was first published in GLOS (No. 3/15, April, 1979, Warsaw), independent sociopolitical monthly.

Andrzej J. Chilecki

GLOS: Let us start with the origins of NOW, what were the aims of its founders, and whose idea was it?

Chojecki: When NOW was founded I was in jail, so I cannot tell much about the origins. I know, however, that the idea originated in the Lublin group, which published the first issue of ZAPIS. The first name used was the Publishing House. We took over the idea and partly the name, because there were no publishing potentials there.

GLOS: Didn't you think that it was too early to establish a publishing house, specializing in literature, when there were difficulties with publishing KOR BULLETIN, the most important publication at the time?

Chojewski: It depends on what is important for whom...?

GLOS: Exactly, that is an interesting question also. What were the goals of the people at the time, what was supposed to be the character of the established publishing house?

Chojewski: As wide as possible and open. In regards to the KOR bulletins and the dissident press, their activity was important only within a certain time framework, ours aimed at publishing texts which would remain on the surface of Poland's social, political, and cultural life.

GLOS: Would you please present the achievements of your publishing house, that is, what was its greatest success, and what was its greatest failure. What plans did you fulfill, and which ones were abandoned?

Z. A.: It seems to me that in mid-1977 our hopes were small and our ambitions did not go beyond publishing several hundred copies, as can be done by the use of a hectograph. But as time went by, I was surprised to find out that we could do more and better. I did not expect such fast publishing growth. As to the texts, we did not have a good grasp of things. Mirek said that we aimed at texts which would remain in the minds, but there were hardly any texts like that ("domestic," written in Poland).

Chojewski: Let me remind you that Brandys, Kijowski, Tarniewski--these were our first publications....

GLOS: But the first publication noticed by the public was in fact THE POLISH COMPLEX by Konwicki. It seems to me that this was the turning point for NOW, because it got the serious reputation which enables it to compete with the official market.

Chojewski: I think that this was mostly due to the number of copies published.

GLOS: I think that more than that was the publishing technique, that is the readers were surprised by the new technique used to publish Konwicki's book.

Z. A.: I think that the readability of the text is the basic criterion regardless probably of technique. Even if Konwicki was published in many copies by the use of stencil, his book would still be noticed.

Chojewski: Going back to your question, I think that the fact that we exist is the greatest achievement, although naturally this is not the achievement of the publishing house.

Z. A.: In a sense our existence is not controlled by us....

GLOS: What about failure?

Chojecki: This concerns the book by Andrzej Kijowski which was published in many copies using the offset technique, which we were not completely familiar with, and consequently we made a serious mistake. It so happened that we got a large quantity of A3-size paper, which allows easier and faster printing because it is larger. The matrices, made to A4 size, were mechanically made for A5 size. We obtained printing, which was a complete mess, opposite page 1 was page 5, etc--there was nothing we could do with it, and all copies, 2,000 of them, we had to burn. This was probably the biggest failure.

Z. A.: I think that our biggest achievement is the number of books published. This is not megalomania on my part, I view it as something very nice, and when I look at our publicity information I am very glad that so many books have already appeared. This view is shared by many people, who obtain our books for the first time. One of the first common feelings is the surprise at the number of books published. Sometimes I think this is just a dream: so many things accomplished in such a short time. As to the failures, however, I do not agree with Mirek. I still insist that we do not get the cooperation from the important authors publishing in Poland.

GLOS: I would like to return to what Mirek called your greatest achievement, i.e. your existence. Could you tell me if your publishing house is an institution, a firm, based on certain legal acts with a perspective to survive for a long time as an institution resistant to outside pressures of varied kinds. I do not mean here just police activities, but also, for example, market changes. For it might happen that the so-called official publications will become important competitors on the market. How much of your activity is spontaneous, a result of the work of several hobbyists, of ad hoc action in a somewhat haphazard fashion?

Z. A.: It is difficult to answer this question precisely. There is a clear tendency to greater formalization and institutionalization of the publishing house which I consider as a very positive phenomenon. I would not want to say, however, that we do not need and that we do not use people who are ideologically committed to this activity.

GLOS: I think that one can be both ideologically committed and at the same time a full-time employee of the publishing house. This relationship does not have to be a contradictory one.

Z. A.: Naturally.

Chojecki: It so happens that all management positions are held by volunteers.

GLOS: I think that when a nonprofit organization simply becomes a profitable enterprise the management is the last group that will switch to full-time positions. What do you think?

Chojecki: I can be considered a full-time employee, although I do not get--in general--any remuneration from the publishing house!

GLOS: The question is whether the publishing house is in a position to financially support all or some of its employees?

Chojecki: It is difficult to offer total support. We cannot afford to maintain an army of people, of course. There are, however, a few whose work at the publishing house is their only occupation. All the rest do it free-lance instead of tutoring or doing other jobs on the side.

GLOS: Could you give the number of people who work for the publishing house as volunteers?

Z. A.: It is difficult to make an estimate. Some are paid for a certain type of work and unpaid for another; it also depends on the state of our finances and ideological posture. There are periods of greater ideological commitment which bring clear volunteer work, and there are periods when some people need money and look for work at any cost, fortunately at our publishing house instead of involving themselves in other types of work.

GLOS: Perhaps, a couple of words about your budget, what are the financial turnovers of the publishing house?

Chojecki: Allow me not to answer this question....

GLOS: What about your monthly budget?

Chojecki: I will not answer this question either....

GLOS: Let us talk about your technical level and your potentials in this area. What I mean is how much can you compete with the regular publishing houses which have printing shops?

Z. A.: There is no competition.

GLOS: Let me put that differently--how many copies of an average size book, 15-sheet format, for example, can you publish?

Chojecki: This depends entirely on our finances. We are able to publish 50,000 to 100,000 copies.

Z. A.: In fact, any number as long as there is demand.

Chojecki: We are in the process of introducing a new technique, which has not been used so far in publishing; it is called a "screen print." Otherwise, we are not going to use any other technique for now. We use now three techniques: screen print, mimeographing, and offset. At the same time, I think that the graphic features will change and become better and better. We intend to use new techniques for the printing of book covers.

GLOS: Such as?

Chojecki: All kinds of lithographs, linocuts...and, in addition to that, one of our forthcoming publications will contain illustrations.

GLOS: Some readers when they look at your publications at first cannot believe that they were published in Poland. And even if they believe it, they imagine that the conditions for producing such publications require a huge facility such as the basement of the Dom Słowa Polskiego and the like.

Chojecki: Let us agree that it is the basement of the Dom Słowa Polskiego and this way satisfy the imagination of those who want to believe it.

GLOS: This question was not intended to amuse the readers. We know that the access to the basement of the Dom Słowa Polskiego is restricted, however, there might be in existence printing techniques, which are available to everybody who would like to try them....

Chojecki: As to printing by the use of the white technique, this can be done by anybody at home. I think that we can teach anybody who would be interested. Everybody has a chance to publish his own collection of poems in as many copies as he wishes. It will simply require a little work, but it will not require any special equipment or anything particularly complicated. We have simplified printing techniques as much as possible.

GLOS: What is the ratio of ordered texts to random ones and how many published texts had been ordered?

Chojecki: It is difficult to talk about random texts, that is about texts that were published by accident. In the first few months, we published texts that reached us by accident. Since then, however, more and more authors have been looking for us to offer their texts. As to ordered texts, we generally do not accept them; the only exception was the pamphlet on Eurocommunism. We assigned an editor and asked several authors to write the textAt present we are preparing a pamphlet entitled PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY, and we are planning several other publications which will present the major political movements in democratic countries.

GLOS: So, in other words, your publishing plans will be based on texts which will reach you without any efforts on your part?

Chojecki: Yes.

GLOS: What criteria do you use in selecting texts for publication and who makes the decision which text will be published?

Z. A.: Basically, we use two criteria: the quality of the text, which is evaluated by the management and a few people who in some cases are asked to write reviews; and demand, which can be easily gaged through our distribution contacts, which, on the one hand, distribute our publications, and, on the other hand, inform us of publishing proposals expressed by the public at large. Thus, we are able to find out how much a given publication satisfies the demand. This criterion is also very important.

GLOS: Now we are talking about the receivers....

Chojecki: A couple of words should be said about our publishing policy, too. When you look at the list of our publications you will see that about 50 percent are sociopolitical texts and documents of all kinds, the other half are essays and fiction. The list also mentions that we publish ZAPIS and PULS. Thus, it is clear that literary texts are in the majority. Basically, as to the sociopolitical texts, it seems to me that we should constantly reduce their number because there are many periodicals that specialize in these matters. Among them are, in addition to GLOS, KRYTYKA, OPINIA, DROGA, and several smaller ones. Therefore, I think that they will be able to provide the necessary amount and level of sociopolitical and economic texts.

Z. A.: This has been taking place already through the initiatives of the ROBOTNIK and GLOS libraries....

Chojecki: Let us return again to the discussion of our plans, because the question was rather passed over. Our publishing plans include, among others, such texts as TIN DRUM by Gunter Grass, translated by St. Baranczak, the publication of all poem collections by Milosz (we are finishing now his CITY WITHOUT A NAME), and in the immediate future we will also publish his CAPTIVE MIND. Moreover, we have decided to publish a selection of texts from the KULTURA monthly--we will be doing that in cooperation with the editorial office of this magazine in Paris. We have made a similar decision in regards to ANEKS. Also, we are planning and have been working for quite a while on a comprehensive selection of texts by L. Kolakowski. As to the demands from the public, this is a complicated matter. After all, nobody tells our distributors which title should be published, although it happens sometimes. We know that there is a demand for the history of the Polish People's Republic. I have heard many requests, and that means that something has to be done. And I do not mean here publications of texts concerning certain events, such as September 17, or Katyn, but a comprehensive monographic work....

GLOS: Simply a history textbook on Poland is needed...?

Chojecki: I am aware of the fact that nobody can write a textbook from the top of his head. In order to popularize--the textbook must be popular--one has first to do specialized research, something that nobody in Poland we can cooperate with does.

Z. A.: This shows how poorly domestic authors fare, no name has been mentioned so far....

Chojecki: This has not been done on purpose, actually there are three of them....

Z. A.: One, and the two others are in a state....

Chojecki: That state is that we have manuscripts, but we cannot reveal their names in advance, because these are domestic authors. We know of pressures that can be put on an author so that he would not give us the text or withdraw it in advance, and that is why we do not like to talk about domestic authors, although in our proposals and publishing plans the ratio of domestic authors to foreign ones is favorable to the former.

Z. A.: But there are only three, not as much as three:

Chojecki: Oh, no again in our plans....We have Wierzbicki, Andrzejewski, Konwicki, Strykowski, also Pawlak prepares a collection of his works, likewise Korzeniewski, so now you have six domestic authors envisaged in our plans. I do not mention PULS and ZAPIS, which are still being published.

GLOS: The tendency of your publishing house is to reverse the ratio in favor of domestic authors, right?

Chojecki: We have only a few foreign authors, NIGHT CONVERSATIONS WITH SMRKOVSky, Hrabal, and that is all. I do not think that any change is required. I think that the ratio is fairly good; we should rather be more open as regards the rest of the world.

GLOS: Would you like to shape the readership market? Would you like to reach certain milieus with your texts? Or perhaps you prefer that the texts be universally accepted and you do not care about individual readers?

Chojecki: This is a complex question. Every publisher strikes to reach the broadest spectrum of readers, and that is rule number 1....

GLOS: But he establishes certain priorities....

Chojecki: I think that NOW does not have any special priorities.

Z. A.: Apart from financial matters....

Chojecki: We would like to reach those milieus which could pay us....

GLOS: So your major criterion is the cost return!

Chojecki: Yes, in order to publish we need money, since such activity is hardly inexpensive....

Z. A.: This is a matter which I consider one of our failures, perhaps common failures of the entire movement. It seems that there is lack of understanding of such activity, it is not fully appreciated. We do not receive funds on time; sometimes, the number of published copies depends on our financial resources and not on technical capacity.

Chojecki: Simply, technical capacity is a different matter. At this point the number of copies published is limited by the distribution capacity or financial resources, or both at the same time. On the other hand, there are many publications which are intentionally printed in small numbers, because we know that this would allow easier distribution and faster return of printing costs. Unfortunately, we distribute mostly among our own crowd, that is in Warsaw, because we assume that the groups outside Warsaw will not be able to get our publications.

GLOS: Now we are touching upon a problem discussed in the text published by you, UNDERGROUND LITERATURE by Pilsudski. Should underground literature be distributed free or for money. As we can see this is an old problem and no radical solution has been found so far....

Z. A.: I support Pilsudski's position, in fact we all do....One may consider a variety of small format texts as underground literature, but books, often of considerable size cannot be treated as such.

GLOS: Are you offering a part of your published materials to those groups which as a rule cannot be counted upon in financial matters, those which will not bring any profits and maybe even offer no cost return?

Chojecki: Yes, we do it for employees, as well as worker and peasant groups.

GLOS: Perhaps you would like to explain the place of your publishing house in the dissident movement?

Chojecki: You mean how we see it, or how we would like to see it?

GLOS: As you see it, and the way you would like to see it.

Chojecki: It is very uncomfortable for me to speak about our enterprise, but I think that our publishing house is the sort of institution which have the most significant impact on the broadening of the base and on the rebuilding of social ties. In these matters it plays a tremendous role. At the same time, it greatly encourages people to take all sorts of actions. Only a couple of years ago possession of such a "book" was dangerous, and everybody who had it tried to hide it as deep as possible. And now he reads it on a tram along with other dissident publications. I think that share of our publishing house in helping to cross this barrier of danger and fear is rather big considering the accessibility of our texts. We have already published some 40 titles.

GLOS: Can you give an approximate figure to give us an idea how many people have come into contact with the texts published by NOW?

Chojecki: I cannot make an estimate like that. I can only say that some 40 titles have been published (up to the end of January 1979--A. J. Ch.) with the average number of copies reaching 1,000 (considering the fact that we no longer publish 1,000 copies). By multiplying the figures we get 40,000 copies published so far by NOW. However, it is impossible to estimate how many people have come into contact with our publishing house. On the other hand, when compared with our adversary, which has at his disposal radio, TV, big newspapers, and all sorts of official publications such as CONVERSATION WITH MY FATHER--our numbers seem to be so insignificant that there is nothing to talk about. It is a lot considering the 2-year period, but insignificant and very small when compared with propaganda and the entire activity of the official institutions.

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FARMERS SUFFERING FROM NEGLECT, PRO-URBAN BIAS

Problems of Rural Child Care

Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 25 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Renata Mroczkowska: "An Unequal Start"]

[Text] Whatever else might be said about the transformations occurring in the countryside and the equilization of differences between rural and urban living standards, and, above all, whatever else might be said about the situation of rural children, one thing is certain: the situation of these children differs from that of their urban peers, and it often differs in being worse. No, not in the material respect, but as regards conditions of life, education, care, upbringing, etc.

In the 1970s several decisions serving directly to improve the situation of rural children have been taken. Some of the normative decrees then issued pertain exclusively to the child and others, to the entire family. Among the most important of these decisions has been the introduction of medical care for the entire rural population on the principle of social insurance. On the other hand, the wage-earner families in the socialized sector of agriculture were, like urban worker families, entitled to, among other things, such benefits as paid leave for mother or father for care of the ill child, unpaid foster leave, prolonged maternity leave, increased pregnancy and family benefits, and lump-sum maternity leave.

Let us not forget that all these benefits are granted to the families of state the employees of state agricultural enterprises and agriculture service institutions, that is, to only 20 percent of the rural population.

Probably above all because of the introduction of free medical care, the health of the rural children in the last 10 years has undergone marked improvement. Preventive medical care has been provided extensively to the younger children on applying a system of protective vaccinations as well as of regular check-ups of the child's physical and psychological development.

Despite the marked increase in the number of rural health centers in recent years (2,530 in 1970, 3,267 in 1977), their number still is not adequate, and the shortcomings are compounded by their nonuniform geographic spacing. This fact acquires tremendous importance when it is considered that rural children fall ill more often than their urban peers and the conditions of their psychophysical development leave much to be desired. The idea that contact with nature in itself is enough for man to develop in good health and without disturbances belongs among fairy tales.

A major accomplishment of the health service is the regular annual decline in rural infant mortality, such that in recent years that mortality began to be higher in town than in country. It is difficult to say whether this radical change results from improvement in rural medical care alone or whether it is to some extent related to the adverse effect of the chemical pollution of the natural environment in urbanized regions.

A phenomenon that is truly disturbing is the fact that illegitimate infants have much smaller chances for survival during the first year of life than do infants born to married women. The mortality factor is about 30 percent higher. The fact that the mortality of illegitimate infants in the countryside is 25 percent higher than in towns prompts reflection. The causes of this situation are complex. Among the most important causes is the fact that some of the births take place without adequate care by the health service, the lack of adequate care of pregnant women, the living conditions of unmarried women, and also lack of tolerance and understanding of the unmarried mother.

During its first few months and years of life the rural child receives varying care. The time that its mother devotes to it depends on the amount of household chores, the size of the farm, and the extent of the farm's mechanization. Thus, most often, the child is taken care of by its older siblings, some not much older, or by a grandmother whose waning strength prevents her from aiding in farm work. And the problem of with whom to leave the child becomes particularly acute in the later stages of a new pregnancy.

Since no statistics comparing the number of creches in town and country are being kept, it is difficult to assess competently the situation of the rural family as regards the availability of creches for its children. There is no doubt that, owing to the nature of the work of women in agriculture, the distances separating individual villages, the lack of a sufficient number of creche-age children in the area of a single village, etc, the efforts by parents to promote the organization of creches in the countryside are much less energetic than in the towns. This institutional form of care is chiefly extended to the children of the employees of the socialized sector of agriculture. On the other hand, there is a keen need for seasonal creches operating during the peak period of farming activities. And yet, the number

of such rural creches is consistently declining. If we consider that there are 918,000 urban children aged from 0 to 2 years and 82,100 vacancies in the urban permanent creches, whereas there are 875,700 rural children in that age group and only 189 vacancies in rural seasonal creches, then, on oversimplifying greatly, it can be stated that in 1975 there were 11 urban children per creche vacancy and 4,623 rural children per creche vacancy. Of course, the actual differences are smaller, but this comparison points to the importance of the problem.

The situation is much better as regards preschool education. In 1977, out of every urban 1,000 children 3-6 years old, 498 children benefited from pre-schools and preschool departments and out of every 1,000 rural children, 250. It should be considered, however, that the statistics on rural children also comprise the children of employees of the socialized sector, for whom access to preschool education stations is much easier. The statistics include among such stations those that function only several hours a week.

In addition, in the countryside there exists the problem of broken families and illegitimate children. Although the number of rural divorces is much smaller than that of urban divorces, it must be considered that the situation of single parents in towns is alleviated by the development of social services, family care benefits, and assistance from places of employment.

Such a complex problem as the provision of out-of-town vacations cannot be ignored. This problem is best illustrated by the fact that 25 percent of rural children, of whom a sizable majority are the children of employees of the socialized sector, benefit from camps and other forms of organized vacation. There exist several reasons for this situation. First, such vacations are granted chiefly to children whose parents are employed in a state or cooperative institutions, whereas the overwhelming masses of private farmers are left out of this program. Second, the employees of institutions operating in the countryside (the postal service, the railroads) generally receive low salaries and, if they have several children, the deductions from their paychecks would often be too much for them. Thirdly, the tradition and habit of sending children away for vacations is absent in the rural milieu. There exist, on the other hand, the tradition and necessity of using children in field work, which happens to reach its peak precisely during the summer season.

In this place we are touching an unusually sore spot--rural child labor. Although there is no doubt that present-day rural children work less on the farm than did their peers in earlier generations, their share in the process of agricultural production still is a major factor.

Most often, children are used to work in the field in such activities as tending cows in pastures, assistance in digging up root crops, raking and mowing hay, and in farm buildings, where they water cattle and feed poultry and chop wood. Household chores are done chiefly by little girls who sweep

the house, care for younger siblings, etc. The overworking of children on private has been the subject of a 1962 study conducted on the initiative of the Department of Education and Culture, NK ZSL [Chief Executive Committee of the United Peasant Party]. At that time, more than 2,000 papers written by students on the subject of "My Work at Home and on the Farm of My Parents" were collected from 100 rural schools throughout the country. The study revealed the existence of a relationship between the overworking of farm children and poor school grades, as expressed chiefly in the fact that farm children take more years to finish school. It has been precisely calculated that the average pupil does 2-3 hours of farm work daily. The real contribution of child labor has been estimated at 3,000-4,000 zlotys annually per child.

This study also revealed a change in attitude toward children in those areas in which a large proportion of the rural population commute to work in industry, trade, or construction. In the families of peasants with outside employment the child does not do as much farm work.

A substantial work load is borne by the children of disadvantaged multiple-child families, in which children are used for household work consisting in minding younger siblings, housecleaning, and preparation of meals--in a word, as substitutes for parents who seek for occasional sources of income outside the farm.

Burdened by household and farm work, the rural child lacks sufficient time and rest needed to do his homework. He attends school under much more difficult conditions than do his urban peers. His start in life is impeded by many factors: the considerable distances between school and home, and the lack of access to many achievements of technology and culture whose spread to the countryside is tardy. The start in life for the rural child is also tremendously affected by his family milieu and the ceaseless conflict between what is good for work and what is good for the individual.

Inadequate Construction

Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 25 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Janusz Weiss: "Without Optimism"]

[Text] Pursuant to Resolution No 128 of 11 June 1976 of the Council of Ministers, nearly 200,000 dwellings for farmers are to be built in single-family form during the current five-year plan period. This is not an amazing number in view of the tremendous housing needs of farmers, who very often live in congested or often even single-room housing and, to make it worse, in primitive buildings.

Unfortunately, the five-year plan as regards single-family construction for rural population is becoming seriously endangered and, if things continue, its fulfillment by the end of next year will fall short by many thousands of dwelling units. For example, last year barely 32,500 single-family homes for farmers could be completed. There exist many indications that this year's plan for building 39,200 homes will also not be fulfilled. And yet, considering the target of 195,000 dwelling units of this type planned for the five-year period, the mean annual rate of increase in their construction should at present have been at least 40,000.

Another example of the difficult situation in rural construction is the disturbing decline in the annual rate of the construction of livestock facilities compared with the results achieved in the final years of the previous five-year plan when 43,700-46,000 facilities of this kind used to be completed annually. During the current five-year plan period the average annual rate of construction of such facilities has been markedly below 40,000. The greatest decline is recorded for the voivodships of the North-eastern Macroregion. The situation as regards the construction of housing and production and service facilities for the socialized sector of agriculture by the enterprises of the Ministry of Agriculture also leaves something to be desired, and the same thing applies to the construction projects performed in the rural communities by other, smaller contractors such as the Ministry of Forestry or the housing construction cooperatives. In rural-commune and village areas the only branch of construction that achieved progress, and even sizable progress at that, compared with the previous five-year plan period, has been the construction of summer camps and of facilities designed for persons generally having no relationship to the farm economy and to agriculture. In addition, many facilities for persons having only a limited relationship to agricultural production or services continue to be built.

This is besides the source of major errors in the estimation of the scope of rural construction. A cursory survey indicates that the private-home construction movement in the countryside is vigorous. However, not every private-home builder in the countryside is a farmer or "purveyor of services" related to agriculture.

Promises and Reality

Building materials are currently virtually worth their weight in gold. The more so as the Ministry of Construction Industry each year consistently fails to keep its promises as to the complete fulfillment of the planned deliveries of cement, lime, wall materials, paper pulp, joinery, etc, to the market. Let us be fair, though, it is not only that ministry that is responsible for the too miserly market deliveries. True, it manufactures

many indispensable products, but not all. It so happens anyway that the shortages of materials and products manufactured by other ministries are fairly often--and now increasingly more often-- felt much more keenly.

Those other ministries also do not keep their promises. Did the Ministry of Metallurgy promise to deliver much greater proportions of metallurgical products, which are indispensable to rural construction? It did. We ourselves wrote about this in previous years. Nothing happened. The demand for metallurgical products is, contrary to the promises, still not satisfied. This particularly concerns steel hoists, whose deliveries farmers were promised to receive in greater quantities than in the previous five-year plan period and in the first few years of the current period.

Another paradoxical and eloquent fact is that, contrary to its promises, the construction industry administered by numerous ministries has failed to fulfill such a fundamental obligation as providing rural construction with supplies and delivering greater quantities of the most scarce and needed products and smaller quantities of products readily available on the market. Examples? Compared to demand, the share of hardwood floors and molding in the overall deliveries of lumber and bituminous pulp has been extremely low. Similarly the proportion of ceramic brick in the overall deliveries of wall materials has been greatly inadequate to the demand. What of it if the output and deliveries of metallurgical products in general have increased? What simply happened is that industry representatives can boast of higher output indicators. To them that is a lot. To us all that is little.

To us all. There is hardly any need to convince anyone in Poland that at least the construction of livestock premises and in general of agricultural production and service facilities as well as of all kinds of farm product processing facilities has an unusually far-reaching effect on the results of agriculture and hence also on providing stores with foodstuffs.

Housing Conditions and Work

Rural housing conditions are a problem whose solution still is not acknowledged as indispensable to the increase in food output. I repeat, rural housing conditions and not just rural housing construction. Housing conditions comprise both the construction of new dwelling units, buildings, and built-up areas and facilities as well as the technical infrastructure (stores, service establishments, health centers, etc), and finally housing conditions conceived in the broadest meaning of the term, inclusive of hygiene (e.g. of air, water), esthetics, the so-called ergonomics of housing and building complexes, etc, etc.

Often, however, farmers believe that housing is less important than livestock facilities and farm buildings in general. They themselves can live in whatever is available. They are unaware that housing conditions have a tremendous effect on labor productivity--which is also true wherever an acute

manpower shortage exists--a shortage that is particularly and acutely obvious in agriculture. What is worse is that this problem has not been recognized by economists, planners, agricultural service, etc.

In view of the excessive migration from the Polish countryside to the cities that has been taking place for years, this problem is of far-reaching significance, particularly as regards the whole of rural problems. Thus while for the time being a gap must exist between the construction of rural production and service facilities and the development of housing conditions in the countryside, as well as between the methods of treatment of these both equally important fields, it should be clearly stated that this is a necessary evil and one that is necessary only at present. The near future will already show that this gap is an unnecessary evil, and hence doubly harmful.

1386

CSO: 2600

VISIT OF CONGOLESE PEOPLES MILITIA COMMANDER

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romania 13 Oct 79 p 5

[Article: "Reception at the Headquarters of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party"]

[Excerpts] Comrade Dumitru Popa, secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP, received on Friday the Congolese delegation headed by Comrade Michele Ngakala, member of the Central Committee of the Congolese Party of Labor, commander of the people's militia of the People's Republic of the Congo, which, at the invitation of the RCP Central Committee, was on a visit of friendship and exchange of experiences in Romania during the period from 6 to 12 October.

Major General Constantin Olteanu, candidate member of the RCP Central Committee, chief of the General Staff of the patriotic guards of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, participated in the meeting which took place in a warm friendly atmosphere.

During its visit to our country, the Congolese delegation also had discussions with local party organs and with the general staffs of the patriotic guards in Bucharest and in Arges and Brasov counties and participated in training activities carried out by subunits of the patriotic guards.

CSO: 2700

JUSTICE MINISTER CRITICIZES PRESS DISCUSSION OF COURT CASES

Bucharest PRESA NOASTRA in Romanian Mar 79 pp 3-5

[Interview with Constantin Stasescu, minister of justice, by Mircea Moarcas]

[Excerpts] One can take satisfaction from the fact that the concerns of journalists in connection with the activity of the judicial organs are taking concrete form in articles with a rich informational content. In particular, I appreciate their efforts and achievements in presenting to the readers the most significant information present in the wide diversity of data which appear in court cases. One should also stress the objective, correct manner in which the court cases and their resolution are presented, a treatment which contributes to the growth of the prestige of the organs of justice and of the authority of their decisions.

However, there are situations in which reality appears to be more or less distorted, either by a subjective attitude on the part of the author or by a superficial examination of all aspects of the case. Also, there are articles in which an atmosphere is created around the trial, forming a certain current of opinion in regard to the court or in regard to the persons involved in the trial. Such articles, which, obviously, are quite rare, are detrimental to the activity of implementing justice, especially in cases in which the trials are in process since they can create in the public a different conclusion in regard to the guilt of the person and in regard to the solution than the conclusion which the court will reach by thoroughly examining all the elements of the case, on the basis of the tests administered.

It should be mentioned, in this regard, that in such situations there is a violation of the obligation--specified in Article 69, letter 1) of the Law on the Press--not to publish material which anticipates a decision in a trial. This is all the more important since the documents of the National Conference [of the Romanian Communist Party, in December 1977] stressed the new significance of the principle of presumption of innocence, according to which a person is considered innocent as long as his guilt has not been established by a final judicial decision.

I might mention the rare appearance in the press--but not without consequences--of articles which, by presenting deficiencies in the activity of a court, give the impression that the situation is general, thus damaging the prestige of the entire judicial system.

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL CHANGES--The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania decrees that: Comrade Ion Rimbu is relieved of his position as deputy minister of forestry economy and construction materials; Comrade Vasile Chivulescu is appointed deputy minister of forestry economy and construction materials; Comrade Ionel Mihail Cetateanu is appointed deputy minister of technical-material supply and control of the management of fixed assets; Comrade Laurean Tulai is appointed deputy minister of the metallurgical industry; Comrade Dumitru Ghise is relieved of his position as deputy chairman of the Council for Socialist Culture and Education; Comrade Cristea Chelaru is appointed deputy chairman of the Council for Socialist Culture and Education; Comrade Ion Ravar is relieved of his position as deputy director general of the Central Directorate of Statistics; Comrade Ion Nicola is appointed deputy director general of the Central Directorate of Statistics. [Excerpts]
[Bucharest BULETINUL OFICIAL in Romanian Part I No 82 15 Oct 79 p 3]

CSO: 2700

ISLAMIC PAPER CONTINUES POLEMIC OVER PRESS ARTICLES

'OSLOBODJENJE' Attack Summarized

Sarajevo PREPOROD in Serbo-Croatian No 19, 1-15 Oct 79 p 3

[Editorial and article on the resolution of the executive board of the Association of Islamic Clergy concerning "Parergon" by Dervis Susis]

[Text] A sharp critical attack on what PREPOROD wrote concerning publication of "Parergon" by Dervis Susis appeared on 25 September of this year in OSLOBODJENJE, the newspaper of the Socialist Alliance of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An article entitled "The 'Work' of Secondary Figures" was signed by Ismet Kreso, chairman of the Business Board of OSLOBODJENJE. The previous day, before OSLOBODJENJE came out, RADIO-TV SARAJEVO published a summary of that critical text on its evening news programs which have the largest audience, thereby giving it still greater publicity and weight, particularly since Radio-Sarajevo repeated it again in certain morning programs the next day.

POLITIKA of Belgrade published the content of OSLOBODJENJE's commentary in somewhat abbreviated form on 26 September, but under the still more provocative title "'Advocates' of Reactionaries From the Past." That article was signed by M. Duric.

We do not know whether any other newspaper carried the article or excerpt from OSLOBODJENJE, but even that which we do know indicates that a very notable place was given to this criticism of the article in PREPOROD.

At the beginning of the article in OSLOBODJENJE it is stated among other things that the authors of the articles in PREPOROD attempt with empty words to "discredit" and "diminish" the significance of this work, without contesting a single statement in Susis' text, their only intention being to instill unrest and resentment among Moslems in neglect of the facts.

It goes on to say that the attack on everything D. Susis wrote in "Parergon" constitutes a defense of reactionaries from the past and calls upon the faithful to attack and curse OSLOBODJENJE because of publication of "Parergon" and thereby cast insults on all the honest citizens and all the faithful who enjoy complete freedom of religious expression. It is certain, it

goes on to say, that the enormous majority of members of the Islamic faith and all honorable people in the Islamic Community will resolutely reject any attempt to manipulate their disposition and distort historical truth.

Stating that the method used by the authors in PREPOROD is very transparent for anyone who is conscious of all the advantages and strength of our community spirit and everything we have achieved in this country, it adds that the authors engage in unilateral polemics with history and call upon others to be quiet about it.

Concluding that the authors of the articles in PREPOROD are afraid of the truths which have been published and those to be published in future, the commentary of OSLOBODJENJE states that the authors of the various articles would like young people to forget the price of freedom. In conclusion it is happy to answer PREPOROD's question about why there was so much advertising for Susis' work and why it was published, saying that its purpose is to demonstrate the kind of bloody errors that resulted from ethnic and religious exclusiveness and blind faith in the self-appointed representatives of the faith and the people, and to encourage more serious historiographic treatments of certain events in the past which have not been fully elucidated. The commentary concluded with the sentence: "So much for now," which might mean that there will be more of this--but on some other occasion.

Hilmo Neimarlija, editor in chief of our newspaper, delivered in his own personal name a response to OSLOBODJENJE, and we hope that readers will be able to read it in the same place where this criticism was published.

Response of Islamic Clergy

Sarajevo PREPOROD in Serbo-Croatian No 19, 1-15 Oct 79 p 3

[Text] In its meeting on 26 September 1979 the Executive Board of the Association of Islamic Clergy in Bosnia-Herzegovina objected to the way in which Dervis Susis, in an article entitled "Parergon" published in OSLOBODJENJE from 6 August to 9 September, treated the role and behavior of members of the Islamic clergy before the war, during the National Liberation Struggle and thereafter. Taking a negative view of members of the Islamic clergy, he did not present a single example of a constructive figure among the Islamic clergy over that entire period. The truth is that both before and during the war there were individuals in the Islamic clergy who did sin against the people. The Islamic clergy itself has always condemned those individuals and their crimes. The Executive Board of the Association of Islamic Clergy of Bosnia-Herzegovina condemns those individuals and their misdeeds even now, standing aloof from them and their unworthy behavior.

However, the large number of splendid figures among the Islamic clergy who made an important contribution before the war, during the National Liberation Struggle and in the postwar construction and development of socialist Yugoslavia not only are not emphasized by that text, but an attempt is made

to create the impression that there were no such people at all. But it is well known that Comrade Tito himself decorated many members of the Islamic clergy for their contribution in the National Liberation Struggle and postwar construction of Yugoslavia, as emphasized in the address of Mustafa Nurikic at the Third Meeting of the Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Bosnia-Herzegovina, held last 17 July, which was published in OSLOBODJENJE on 8 August 1979:

"There are splendid examples of clergymen who during the National Liberation Struggle made their contribution to the liberation of our nationalities and ethnic minorities as well as of all clergymen who through their efforts made an important contribution in the postwar construction of our country and of the self-managed socialist society, for which many have been commended by Comrade Tito and have received many of our highest decorations; they deserve our honor and respect, and their example should motivate all clergymen. It therefore seems to me that more attention should be paid at least to those splendid examples, and this should be done through clergymen's associations, and work should be done even now to investigate and elucidate the constructive role of clergymen in the National Liberation Struggle and postwar construction of our society. In that way we would learn about these people and their contribution; at present we know little or nothing. It is a fact, that is, that up to now attempts in this direction have been unorganized and almost timid, so that exceedingly little of these things are known, and I think that it would be worthwhile in every respect if our public were informed more broadly about this."

The Executive Board of the Association of Islamic Clergy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is amazed that this text of Susis' is being published precisely when the broadest public campaign is being waged to affirm the Association of Islamic Clergy together with other clergymen's associations and all associations of citizens as a constitutive part of the SAWP and the best form for members of the Islamic clergy, as equal citizens and builders of our self-managed socialist society, to be fully involved in all its activities as a group. After all, at this point there really is a need to develop all the constructive factors for involvement of members of the Association of Islamic Clergy in all public actions and to affirm all the constructive achievements in the work of members of the Islamic clergy to date. Susis' text contests this initiative and denies the efforts which the Association of Islamic Clergy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is making in this direction.

The Association of Islamic Clergy has never been against presenting the truth about the past of the Islamic clergy and about the behavior of its members. However, the Executive Board is offended that Susis' text is being published in OSLOBODJENJE instead of documents and essays about the Islamic clergy and its role in the past which have been given scholarly and public certification.

During the publication of Susis' text members of the Association of Islamic Clergy accepted some of the allegations, expecting that in the later installments there would be examples of the constructive figures from among

the Islamic clergy in the period covered by the series entitled "Parergon." However, Susis' text in OSLOBODJENJE ended without presenting a single such example.

Feeling that further efforts need to be made toward objective elucidation of the entire work and role of the Islamic clergy in the past, the Executive Board of the Association of Islamic Clergy in Bosnia-Hercegovina deems it necessary for the objective truths about this to be presented in PREPOROD on the basis of sources and writings which have scholarly and public recognition.

7045

CSO: 2800

BRIEFS

BRIBERY TRIAL IN PRIZREN--The Prizren district court, headed by Agim Krasniq, found Muharrem Buzhala, traffic officer in Prizren, guilty of five crimes involving the taking of bribes, for which he was sentenced to 3½ years in prison and fined 38,000 dinars, the amount he had taken in bribes. Accused with him were Abdyl Gashi, conductor employed by "Kosovatransit" in Prizren, who was sentenced to 2 years in prison, and Musli Nishori, a farmer from the village of Temecin in Suva Reka Opstina who was sentenced to 1½ years and the return of 2,000 dinars he had taken in bribes. Five others were given lesser sentences for taking bribes to issue drivers licenses in this area where 30 people or more had "bought" drivers licenses in this way. [Pristina RILINDJA in Albanian 21 Sep 79 p 8]

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